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Abstract 
 
As water is increasingly recognized as a scarce resource, the use of economic arrangements for water 
resources management seems increasingly promising. Experiences show that economic arrangements can 
contribute to a more efficient use of water resources but only if specific conditions are met, related to a 
well-functioning institutional framework and regulations that ensure that the use of economic arrangements 
is balanced with broader societal objectives. One of the remaining questions is how to replicate the existing 
cases where economic arrangements are successfully used in water resources management in other areas 
where the conditions seem promising. Therefore, this paper reviews three cases in the USA, Ecuador and 
Australia where economic arrangements have been successfully applied, focusing on the processes that 
have characterized their evolution. Based on these cases, it is concluded that stakeholder-oriented valuation 
can offer useful support for the development of economic arrangements for water resources management 
and an approach for such stakeholder-oriented water valuation is briefly outlined and illustrated. 
 
 
Keywords: economic arrangements, water markets, water valuation, stakeholder processes, stakeholder-
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Introduction 
 
Water is increasingly recognized as a scarce resource in a growing number of regions. Numerous countries 
are expected to experience structural water stress, whereas numerous others are facing problems in 
securing sufficient water resources during occasional periods of drought. Also polluting activities and 
deteriorating water quality threaten the reliability of water supplies and contribute to the scarcity of 
freshwater resources of sufficient quality. Water scarcity may be related to physical scarcity of water 
resources, it may be due to scarcity in financial means to develop infrastructure to access and distribute 
water resources, it may be induced by poor management of existing infrastructure or it may be caused by 
inadequate (enforcement of) institutional arrangements for the allocation of access rights to water resources 
and inadequate arrangements for pollution control. 
 
The increasing awareness of the scarcity of water resources has led to the adoption of the principle that 
‘water is an economic good’ as one of the four Dublin principles in 1992, which are widely accepted as the 
basis for integrated water resources management (IWRM). Economics deals with the allocation of scarce 
goods over various competing demands and therefore this view of (scarce) water resources as economic 
goods seems to make good sense. The focus of various OECD studies on ‘making markets work for water 
management’ and on the use of water pricing is in line with this (OECD, 1999, 2002, 2003), as well as the 
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focus of the FAO/Netherlands Conference on Water for Food and Ecosystems on the ‘new economy’ as 
one of its main themes (FAO/Netherlands, 2005). 
 
Using economic arrangements for water resources management seems promising but is by no means easy. 
Experiences show that economic arrangements need to be embedded within an appropriate institutional 
framework and that the objective of economic efficiency needs to be balanced with broader societal 
objectives. As the interest in market instruments has grown, more insight has been gained in the conditions 
within which they may or may not be successfully applied for water resources management. However, the 
question remains how to replicate the existing cases where economic arrangements are successfully used in 
water resources management in other areas where the conditions seem promising. Therefore, this paper 
sets out to review some of existing cases where economic arrangements have been successfully applied, 
focusing on the processes that have characterized their evolution. 
 
Economic arrangements for water resources management 
 
Water as an economic good 
 
Water is a valuable resource, but its value is rarely reflected in monetary terms. Using economic 
arrangements in water management can be useful as a means to capture certain important values in cash 
flows and to allow economic exchange mechanisms to support the allocation of water resources and the 
associated costs and benefits among stakeholders. Examples of such economic arrangements are for 
instance payment schemes for environmental services (FAO, 2002, 2004c), water quality trading schemes 
(EPA, 2004), green water credits (Dent, 2005) and water markets for the trading of water rights or 
entitlements (Kloezen, 1998; World Bank, 1999). The use of such economic arrangements and market 
approaches is expected to lead to a more economically efficient allocation of water resources as compared 
to more administrative allocation mechanisms. Especially market arrangements are believed to provide a 
more flexible allocation mechanism that also provides economic incentives to water users to use water 
resources in an economically efficient way (Briscoe, 1996; Kloezen, 1998; World Bank, 1999; Bjornlund 
and McKay, 2002). 
 
Although the available examples show that economic arrangements can be successfully applied to deal 
with scarcity issues in water resources management, various authors have convincingly argued that water is 
not an ordinary economic good (Perry et al., 1997; Savenije, 2001). One should recognize that property 
and user rights may be complex, that physical characteristics often hinder transfers of large water volumes 
from one place to another and that water is a non-substitutable resource. Although these complexities may 
be less present in certain parts of the drinking water industry, they certainly do apply to agricultural water 
uses (Savenije, 2001). In economic terms, water resources are neither purely public nor purely private 
goods and they are mostly non-excludable but rivalrous in consumption; in principle, everyone is able to 
withdraw water resources from a shared base, or everyone is able to degrade the resource base through 
polluting activities, and when one person has used or degraded a given quantity of water, this water is no 
longer available in this quality for other users. This means that water resources are more appropriately 
classified as common pool resources (Kaul et al., 1999). 
 
Balancing economy and institutions 
 
The fact that water is a common pool resource implies that market failures are likely to occur when using 
economic arrangements for water management, which means that these arrangements might lead to 
outcomes that are undesirable from a societal perspective (Hellegers and Perry, 2004). Broader societal 
interests require that other values be taken into account beyond mere market values, such as food security, 
conservation of ecosystems, employment, balanced rural-urban development, protection of vulnerable 
groups, etcetera. Thus, the successful application of economic arrangements for agricultural water 
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management is not straightforward but needs to be balanced with the use of institutional arrangements to 
safeguard broader societal interests and to reduce or mitigate the negative impacts of market failures 
(Bjornlund and McKay, 2002; Hellegers and Perry, 2004). In other words, water markets are by default 
regulated markets. 
 
A review of institutional frameworks in successful water markets confirm the need to combine economic, 
and institutional arrangements and indicates some of the institutional factors that are likely to support 
successful and sustainable application of economic arrangements in water resources management. These 
include factors that are equally important for both the introduction of market arrangements as for other 
administrative allocation systems, such as active water user participation, with structures that provide 
transparency and accountability among users, an administrative system that registers and enforces timely 
water deliveries and a well-maintained water delivery infrastructure (WorldBank, 1999). This implies that 
the lack of well-functioning institutions cannot simply be bypassed by the introduction of market 
arrangement, but also, that the lack of well-functioning institutions should not necessarily be a reason to 
refrain from the use of economic instruments altogether. When functioning institutions are absent, 
institutional strengthening is anyhow needed for improved water resources management. 
 
Nevertheless, there are some additional requirements when one prefers an economic over a more 
administrative approach. These include the need for transferable water property rights and water 
allocations (in the case of water markets), for information and transaction mechanisms to facilitate 
economic transfers and for a mechanism to deal with externalities, to negate the effect of third party 
interests or to mitigate negative impacts which might occur (Perry et al., 1997; WorldBank, 1999; 
Bjornlund and McKay, 2002; Hellegers and Perry, 2004). 
 
The process leading up to the successful introduction of economic arrangements in water management. 
 
Although some knowledge is now available on the institutional requirements for the use of economic 
arrangements in water management, still little seems to be known about the processes that precede the 
successful introduction of such economic arrangements – successful here meaning that the introduced 
arrangements promote a more economically efficient allocation of water resources, in a sustainable way, 
and without compromising important social, cultural and ecological values. A better understanding of the 
processes behind the success stories will help to draw some lessons on what is needed to improve the 
development of successful and sustainable economic arrangements in other places. What is the process that 
leads towards the successful introduction of such arrangements and how can it be supported? 
 
Without pretending to be exhaustive, three fairly recent cases are discussed where economic arrangements 
have been introduced for water resources management: the New York City Watershed Agreement in the 
USA, the ‘fondo ambiental del agua’ in Quito, Ecuador and water rights trading in the Murray-Darling 
Basin in Australia. These cases are generally considered to be successful, as illustrated by their inclusion in 
the recent Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Water report (MA, 2005) and by citations in various other 
international publications as good examples, as the coming sections will illustrate. They show that 
economic arrangements can be successfully applied to water resources management, linking the provision 
of good quality water resources to financial flows between beneficiaries and providers. In all three cases 
economic arrangement were introduced fairly recently, which is likely to increase the relevance of insights 
into the processes that lead to their adoption for future replications. 
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The processes behind the introduction of economic arrangements in water 
management in cases in the US, Ecuador and Australia 
 
The New York City Watershed Agreement 
 
Description of the NYC Watershed Agreement 
New York City (NYC) relies on the provision of clean water from upstate watersheds for the water supply 
of about nine million people. In order to protect the source and to maintain the quality of its drinking water, 
the city has reached an agreement with the upstream watershed communities to finance the implementation 
of measures that will help control pollution from agricultural and domestic sources. Under this agreement, 
New York City makes funds available to the watershed residents for the implementation of best 
management practices on farms, the upgrade of wastewater treatment facilities, the rehabilitation of septic 
systems, the improvement of storm water runoff systems and the acquisition of land from upstate 
landowners on a voluntary basis (NRC, 2000; Platt et al., 2000). This agreement costs New York City 
approximately US$1.5 billion over ten years (NRC, 2000). 
 
The funds are administered by the Catskill Watershed Corporation, which is a non-for-profit corporation 
established under the agreement to administer programs for the watersheds. It includes members from the 
watershed communities, as well as representatives of state and city government. A Watershed Agricultural 
Program has been incorporated into the agreement, administered by a council composed of farm, 
agribusiness and environmental leaders, to review, approve and support efforts on individual farms to 
improve the water quality of surface and groundwater resources (Platt et al., 2000).  
 
This New York City Watershed Agreement has received considerable attention as an ‘innovative set of 
economic alternatives for protecting water quality for one of the world’s largest public water systems’ 
(WWAP, 2003), a ‘turning point’ for valuing ecosystems services (Economist, 2005), and ‘a prototype of 
the utmost importance to all water supply managers’ (NRC, 2000). It can be regarded as one of the first 
payment schemes for environmental services (PES) and thus is of considerable importance. Currently, 
there is much interest in the use of such PES schemes to support water resources management. PES 
schemes are flexible compensation mechanisms by which the providers of environmental services are 
compensated by users that benefit from these services. PES schemes in watersheds usually involve the 
implementation of financial mechanisms to compensate upstream communities for activities that are 
expected to maintain or improve the availability and/or quality of water resources for downstream uses 
(Kiersch et al., 2005). 
 
Process leading to the Watershed Agreement 
The process leading to the New York City Watershed Agreement was triggered by the Surface Water 
Treatment Rules that were issued by the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1989. These 
rules were meant to ensure the safety of drinking water by requiring filtration of water from surface water 
sources, unless it could be proven and guaranteed that the surface water sources met very high water 
quality standards. As New York City was relying on surface water reservoirs for its drinking water, which 
was currently not filtered before distribution, the new federal rules implied that the city would possibly 
have to build a filtration plant for its drinking water in order to safeguard public health. This would costs 
some US$ 6-8 billion, as well as some US$ 300 million operating costs annually according to 1993 New 
York City estimates (Platt et al., 2000; NRC, 2000). 
 
In order to avoid filtration, New York City had to show that the high quality of the water from the 
watersheds could also be guaranteed for the year to come. Therefore, New York City started cooperative 
efforts to protect its watershed together with the local governments and farmers. In 1992 the Watershed 
Agricultural Program started as a cooperative program between the City’s Department of Environmental 
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Protection and farmers in the watershed. Also in 1992, Whole Community Planning was started as a 
platform for negotiations between NYC and the communities on maintenance of water quality standards. 
 
However, by the end of 1993 the cooperation between New York City and the watershed communities 
ended abruptly when New York City presented its proposal for meeting the filtration avoidance 
requirements. These plans consisted of new watershed rules and regulations1 and the large-scale purchase 
of lands to prevent further degradation of water resources in the watershed. These plans were considered 
unacceptable by the watershed communities, who feared the plans would impair economic development 
and reduce property values. In December 1993 the Coalition of Watershed Towns filed a lawsuit against 
New York City to prevent it from executing its plans. This led to an impasse in efforts to reach an 
agreement about a watershed management plan which lasted for over a year, until the Governor of New 
York State intervened in April 1995 (Platt et al., 2000). The negotiations that started in 1995 resulted in an 
agreement in principle later that year: “There were more than 200 meetings, many of them bitter and 
unproductive. But in the end – the last details were worked out at 4:20 yesterday morning – the combatants 
agreed on a plan.” (NYTimes, 1995). In January 1997 the final Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was 
signed and formally executed. 
 
Conclusions from the case 
In the case of the New York City Watershed Agreement, the establishment of an economic payment 
scheme was the result of a difficult negotiation process, which eventually led to an agreement on specific 
types of activities to be included in the payment scheme. New York City was a key player in this process, 
combining significant economic and political weight in the region with a clear motivation to avoid an 
enormous investment in a filtration plant for its drinking water. 
 
Fondo ambiental del agua (FONAG) in Quito 
 
Description of the FONAG 
The Quito valley is one of the most densely populated areas in Ecuador, including the Quito metropolis 
with more than 2 million inhabitants. It faces large water related problems because of the high water 
demands combined with contamination of limited water resources. In Quito, a water protection fund, 
‘fondo ambiental del agua’ (FONAG), has been established to collect money from the downstream 
beneficiaries of water related services in the Quito metropolis to provide donations to the national park 
administrations and to support local programmes of interest to FONAG in the watersheds that supply water 
to Quito. These activities include reforestation, environmental education, surveillance and monitoring of 
water quality, investigation of sustainable community production alternatives. Although at this point it 
remains difficult to quantify the impacts of these projects, some conditions have been laid out to ensure 
that funds are spent wisely, including limits in the amounts of money that can be spent on the management 
of the fund and on studies (Lloret, 2005). The FONAG should help to safeguard downstream interests, 
consisting of water supply for the city of Quito, including drinking water for households and water for 
industry, and power generation in a hydropower reservoir. 
 
Membership to FONAG is on a voluntary basis and consists of both public and private organizations, who 
entered into a long-term agreement. The diversity of members and their long-term commitment is 
considered to be one of the strong features of the fund. It means that FONAG is not constrained by the 
many rules and regulations that apply to public agencies, making it for instance easier to attract foreign 
donor investments, while the fund’s (semi) public members and its constitution provide safeguards that the 
fund’s activities are beneficial to public interest. 
 
                                                 
1 Based on the State Public Health Law, NYC has the authorization to make watershed rules and regulations to protect its drinking 
water supply from contamination, although these rules are subject to the approval of the State of New York. 
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FONAG is, just as the New York City Watershed Agreement, another example of a PES scheme and 
during recent years, many similar payment schemes for environmental services have been implemented in 
the Latin American region (FAO, 2004c; Kiersch et al., 2005). The FONAG features in many of the recent 
overviews of payment schemes for environmental services, from an article in the Economist (2005), to the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA, 2005), the Katoomba Marketplace (Katoomba, 2005), recent 
work by FAO (2002, 2004c) and the FAO/Netherlands Conference on Water for Food and Ecosystems 
(Lloret, 2005). 
 
Process leading to the establishment of FONAG 
The water supply of the city of Quito originates mainly from two watersheds located in the Cayama-Coca 
(4 000 km²) and Antisana Ecological Reserve (1 200 km²) in the Andean mountains. Although both areas 
are under environmental protection, the watersheds are threatened through several land uses such as 
agricultural production, extensive livestock grazing with impacts on both water quality and quantity for 
drinking and irrigation water use, power generation, and recreation. Destruction of forests and grassland 
(páramo) which contributes to the degradation of the high plateau is assumed to affect the stream flow 
causing floods in winter and drought in summer (Kiersch et al., 2005). 
 
To ensure the conservation of the water resources in the watersheds for the drinking water supply of Quito, 
the Nature Conservancy (TNC) and the Fundación Antisana, a local NGO, launched the idea in 1997 to 
establish a fund that would make an explicit link between the use of water and the conservation of the 
watershed (Katoomba, 2005). With the support of USAID and the Quito Metropolitan Area Sewage and 
Potable Water Agency (EMAAP-Q), this lead to the creation of the FONAG water protection fund in 
January 2000. In May 2001, also the Quito power company (Empresa Eléctrica Quito) entered as a 
constituent, as did the private company Cervecería Andina in March 2003. Recently, also the Swiss 
Development Cooperation has joint the Fund, as well as the Ministry of Environment, which has an 
observer status. The constituents contribute to the Fund, varying from 1 percent of drinking water revenues 
by EMAAP-Q to an annual fixed amount by others, with written agreements for the 80 years of the Fund’s 
constitution. At the start of 2005, the Fund had close to 2 million dollars and investment bonds for the year 
2005 were estimated at close to 500,000 dollars (Lloret, 2005). 
 
Although this may appear to have been a straightforward process, in fact ‘the process has been slow and 
painstaking’ (Katoomba, 2005). Initially, the city mayor and the boards of directors of the water utility and 
the power company had to be convinced of the potential benefits of the fund (Katoomba, 2005). Once 
established, field activities financed by FONAG did not start until 2004, years after the establishment of 
the fund, because FONAG works with the interest, not the capital, on the money in the fund (Katoomba, 
2005; Lloret, 2005). In fact, the fund still has to prove that it is really contributing to improved availability 
of water resources. The lack of understanding of linkages between specific watershed protection activities 
and water flow and quality makes it difficult to assess how much of the desired service actually reaches the 
users. As of yet, statements concerning outcomes in terms of environmental improvement or hydrological 
returns are not available (Kiersch et al., 2005). 
 
Conclusion from the case 
The case of FONAG indicates that the payment scheme is based largely on a ‘virtual’ market for activities 
that are expected, but not yet proven, to contribute to the sustained availability of good quality water 
resources. It is the result of a process initiated by non-governmental organizations that lasted several years 
and that gradually gained more momentum, after its participants were sufficiently convinced of the value 
of the services and activities supported by the Fund. 
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Water rights trading in the Murray-Darling Basin 
 
Introduction to the case 
The Murray-Darling river basin spans several states in the south-east of Australia and some three million 
people inside and outside the basin heavily depend on its water resources. The development of the basin’s 
water resources has enabled the expansion of agricultural activity and currently the agricultural produce in 
the basin exceeds AU$ 10 billion (MDBC, 2004). Since the 1950s, the growing water demands have 
caused declining water quality, rising water tables and increased salinity. To help prevent further 
degradation of the water resources a cap has been put on diversion, limiting annual diversions, effective 
from July 1997. 
 
Within the cap, water entitlements may be traded and prices are determined by the market. The trading 
arrangements that are in place for the Murray-Darling river basin in Australia are an often cited example 
for river basin management and well-functioning water markets (e.g. Tarlock, 2001; Bjornlund and McKay, 
2002; Moss et al., 2003, FAO, 2004b). Trading arrangements have first been put in place on state level and, 
although a pilot has been started on interstate water trading, the state level experiences are more advanced. 
The specific trading arrangements are illustrated here for the state of New South Wales. 
 
Water trading arrangements in New South Wales 
Water trading in New South Wales (NSW) is based on the trade of water rights, which are separated from 
land titles. Individual water rights are vested in water licences that define a share in the available water 
resources, expressed as a unit share rather than as a fixed volume per year. The actual volume that a 
licence-holder is entitled to differs per year, based on water availability, and is called the annual water 
allocation. Water licences as well as annual water allocations can be traded and water licences can be split 
and consolidated (DIPNR, 2005). 
 
Generally, at the start of the water year government officials make an available water determination 
(AWD), specifying the water volumes per unit (e.g. 0.8 megalitres per unit), taking into account aspects 
such as climate, storage, flow levels and historic usage. This provides the basis for the annual water 
allocations to individual licence holders, which is calculated as units in the licence * water volume per unit. 
This annual water allocation is credited to the water allocation account of the licence holder, which, similar 
to a bank account, specifies how much units of water a licence holder is entitled to. For some licence 
categories, AWDs may be made throughout the year if more water becomes available (DIPNR, 2005). 
 
The system of tradable water licences and water allocations deals mainly with water diversions for 
commercial purposes, such as irrigation of crops. The overall extraction limits for the source, specific 
environmental water rules and the rules under which the available water determinations are made available 
are determined in the water sharing plans, which are mandatory for all water sources in NSW. Rural 
landholders are entitled to basic rights to water without a licence and there also is a provision that 
recognizes the cultural and spiritual importance of water to Aboriginal people in NSW (DIPNR, 2005). In 
dry periods, priority is given to the environment, urban water supply, rural drinking water supply and 
finally irrigation (Huckell, 2005). This means that in dry years, the volumes of water needed for the 
environment and for drinking water supply (priority allocations) are first abstracted from the total available 
volume, before calculating the water volumes per unit for commercial water licences. 
 
Process leading to the establishment of water trading arrangements in New South Wales 
The serious problems related to overexploitation of the water resources in the Murray-Darling river basin 
triggered the involved states’ ministers to limit annual water diversions in each of the basins states to the 
volume of water that would have been diverted under 1993/94 levels of development (MDBC, 2004). In 
New South Wales, enforcing this cap proved especially difficult, as in 1996 and 1997 three major sub-
basins in this State exceeded the cap (Tarlock, 2001). The Government of New South Wales announced a 
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comprehensive water reform package in 1997, initiating a participatory stakeholder process through the 
establishment of community based Water Management Committees (WMCs). The outcomes of this 
process was consolidated in the 2000 Water Management Act, which consolidated previous legislation.  
 
The Water Management Act required the development of water sharing plans for all water sources in NSW 
by local water management committees, which should give directions for water allocations between 
competing users, including between the environment and extractive users (ACIL, 2002). Furthermore, the 
Water Management Act provided a framework for these water sharing plans, determining the conditions 
for water rights and the duration of the water sharing plans. However, the duration of the water sharing 
plans and of the water rights proved an important source of disagreement. Initially, the state government of 
NSW announced plans for water sharing plans to have five year tenure (NFA, 2005) and to confirm 
existing rights for only ten years (Moran, 2003). For farmers, a longer tenure for water sharing and 
perpetuity of water rights was important to allow security for their investments. If water sharing 
arrangements could change regularly and if water rights could be lost, risks of investment would become 
too high and obtaining credits from financing institutions would be almost impossible (Huckell, 2005). 
 
Eventually, the framework for most water management provisions in New South Wales evolved largely 
from agreements on water made between the Commonwealth and the states in the Council of Australian 
Governments, which resulted in the National Water Initiative, signed on 25 June 2004 (Hamstead & Gill, 
2004; DIPNR, 2005). The 2004 NSW Water Management Amendment Act gave effect to aspects of the 
National Water Initiative, including the creation of perpetual water rights and the provision for the term of 
a water sharing plan to be extended beyond its ten years. This development was in parallel to the 
agreement reached in NSW that existing rights were to be converted into perpetual water access licenses, 
in return for agreed cuts on agricultural water use of a further 3%, in addition to the basin cap, over period 
of 10 years, from 2004 to 2014 (Huckell, 2005). In the agreed trading scheme, there is a phased transition 
towards full trading to protect farmers in existing irrigation systems. To ensure that not of all of sudden 
tail-end farmers within an irrigation system find themselves alone within a system, facing much higher 
burden of operation and maintenance costs for irrigation infrastructure, only 4% of water licence can be 
traded annually. This will eventually be phased out (Huckell, 2005). 
 
Conclusions from the case 
The water trading schemes in place in New South Wales in the Murray-Darling river basin resulted from a 
long process of political negotiations and legislative reform, triggered by increasing water scarcity and 
influenced by external pressures from the interstate basin level and the national level. Water trading is 
embedded in a complex system of rules and regulation that has been established through this political 
process and that include various safety guards such as the rules for the establishment of water availability 
determinations and a phased transition towards full trading. Within this legislative framework, further 
conditions for water allocations are determined by the local water managements committees, through the 
development of water sharing plans. 
 
Key conclusions from the cases 
 
Although the three cases covered two very different types of economic arrangements, namely water 
protection funds or payment for environmental service schemes in New York City and Quito and water 
markets in New South Wales, one key aspect clearly emerges from the descriptions of the processes that 
preceded the described arrangements: economic arrangements are the result of a (long) negotiation process 
among stakeholders. The arrangements were put in place only when the stakeholders agreed on the 
adoption of trading mechanisms or payment schemes. This was the result of a stakeholder process which 
had its own pace and rationale and that was not imposed by an external (government) actor, but that was 
initiated after years of profound problems causing stakeholders to unite for action. Conflict and distrust 
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among stakeholders was often part of this process, but also a joint realization that sound water management 
required a cooperative approach and a joint recognition of the value of water. 
 
A negotiated agreement among stakeholders is key, because the successful economic arrangements in the 
described cases operate within well-defined boundaries. They are part of a larger package of economic, 
administrative and institutional arrangements to ensure that a broad range of societal values are included. 
Particularly the rules and regulations that shaped the administrative and institutional arrangements were the 
subject of negotiations among stakeholders, before they trusted the ‘invisible hand’ of the market to play 
its role. The agreements for the New York City Watershed and for the FONAG in Quito are basically 
agreements on the way in which the economic funds are regulated: how much funds are to be made 
available or how funds are to be collected, and what guidelines and procedures apply for financing projects 
and activities with these funds. Although much closer to a free market, also the trade in water rights in the 
Murray-Darling basin is constrained by various licenses and trading rules and is embedded in an 
institutional and regulatory system that safeguards environmental baseflows as well as social fairness. The 
importance of the regulatory arrangements in the last case is further underlined by the facts that existing 
laws were changed to enable the use of market mechanisms. 
 
Although previous studies on existing economic and market mechanisms in water management did not 
focus on the process leading up to those mechanisms, the findings here are very much in line with the 
findings from previous studies. As was mentioned in an earlier section, those studies point out the need to 
balance economic arrangements with institutional, regulatory and administrative arrangements, but they 
also point out the importance of active stakeholder participation for the proper functioning of the resulting 
hybrid economic/administrative/regulatory systems (Briscoe, 1996; World Bank, 1999). Thus, stakeholder 
processes are important throughout the lifecycle of these hybrid systems, from their early conception to 
their sustained use. 
 
Stakeholder-oriented water valuation to support the development of economic 
arrangements 
 
The potential of water valuation to support the development of economic arrangements 
 
Stakeholder processes determine the success of economic arrangements in water resources management. 
As transparency and accountability are known success factors for existing economic arrangements (World 
Bank, 1999), they are also likely to be important for the stakeholder processes leading up to those 
arrangements. Offering stakeholders a mechanism for the transparent assessment of important water values 
is potentially very useful to help them reach an agreement on those values and on the ways to manage them 
through the use of regulated economic arrangements. 
 
So far, an explicit and transparent assessment of water values and the way they are impacted is often absent 
in the process leading up to economic arrangements. In the case of New York City, the costs of building a 
filtration plant were very clear and high enough to trigger action, but even here, the agreed package of 
US$ 1.5 billion does not offer a guarantee that the activities under the agreement will be sufficient to meet 
official water quality standards within the time frame of the filtration avoidance granted by the EPA (NRC, 
2000; Hermans et al. 2003). In Quito, the contributions to the fund by the constituents are set rather 
arbitrarily, based on their individual willingness and ability to pay, and the eventual impacts of projects 
funded by the FONAG on water availability downstream remain as of yet largely unknown. 
 
Nevertheless, a certain common understanding on the value of water resources is necessary to reach an 
agreement on the design of economic arrangements. Eventually, an accurate valuation is important to 
ensure sustainability of these economic arrangements. In the case of New York City and Quito, those who 
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pay for the activities in watersheds want to ensure that the money they spend is actually contributing to the 
provision of water resources. In the Murray-Darling basin, direct costs of purchasing a certain volume of 
water is set in the market place, but the societal transaction costs to enable this market to function should 
also be taken into account. Registration of licences, water accounts and trade, and monitoring of water 
diversions are all required for a well-functioning market. The costs for maintaining this institutional and 
administrative support infrastructure should be reasonable in relation to the contribution of the markets to 
improved water resources management. 
 
In general, valuation is a prerequisite to address the question whether or not economic arrangements 
contribute to the sustainability of agricultural water use and quality. Limits in technical knowledge limit 
the extent to which the costs and benefits associated with economic arrangements can be assessed, but 
nevertheless, some sort of assessment or valuation needs to be done, both in deciding about new 
arrangements and in monitoring progress in using existing ones. But then how does one help stakeholders 
to decide on the appropriate rules and regulations for well-functioning economic arrangements? 
 
The need for a new approach to water valuation 
 
Economic valuation methods such as market-based approaches, contingent valuation, hedonic pricing and 
the travel-cost method help to express environmental values into monetary terms, incorporating 
externalities in a total or full economic value of water resources (FAO, 2004a). This offers a logical 
starting point to translate water values into financial flows through market arrangements and to ‘internalize 
the externalities’. Nevertheless, the three cases have shown that in the success stories, calculations of full 
economic values have not played a decisive role in the development of economic arrangements. Several 
explanations for this can be found: 
1. Specific costs and benefits associated with watershed protection and water uses are difficult to quantify 
and to capture in monetary terms, not only in developing countries, but also for instance in the case of 
New York City and Australia. The limited accuracy reduces the usefulness of economic valuation 
methods in practice. 
2. Stakeholders may value other things in addition to narrowly defined economic values expressed in 
dollars, such as social stability and environmental sustainability. Of course these values can somehow 
be translated into monetary values, but, apart from the methodological constraints involved in 
conducting such translations, this ignores the fact that trade-offs between such values are within the 
realm of politics rather than economics (cf. Hellegers and Perry, 2004). 
3. Economic valuation is a tool for researchers and analysts and as such it is disconnected from 
stakeholder processes. The pace of stakeholder negotiations may not fit the timeframes needed for 
proper analytic valuation exercises, or, when external experts are consulted by one or more 
stakeholders, their advice may simply be overruled by the client, as was the case for an expert panel 
consulted by EPA in the New York City case (Okun et al., 1997). 
 
Thus, although in principle the existing methods for economic water valuation can offer useful support for 
the design of economic arrangements for water resources management, their application in practice is 
limited. There is a need to complement the existing suite of economic valuation methods with an approach 
that is specifically oriented towards the stakeholders and their negotiation processes that determine the 
design and implementation of economic schemes. Rather than regarding valuation as an external input, it is 
to be recognized as an intrinsic part of the stakeholder process – throughout their negotiation process, 
stakeholders are making various choices, which implies that they value one thing over another. Valuation 
should help stakeholders to gain more insight into the values affecting their choices, so as to take them 
more consciously into account when making their choices. However, these values are not always strictly 
economic. This means that the established economic valuation tools and methods can be part of a 
stakeholder-oriented approach, but they are not the sole focus and they are only to be used if they can 
usefully contribute to clarifying values and reaching agreements among stakeholders. 
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A general process for stakeholder-oriented water valuation 
 
Stakeholder-oriented valuation approaches have been explored in several cases for local water resources 
management, for instance in Tanzania (FAO, 2005), Sri Lanka and Lao PDR (Nguyen et al., 2005a,b) and 
Cambodia (IUCN, 2005). A forthcoming publication by FAO, IWMI, IUCN and Imperial College 
capitalizes on the experiences and insights gained so far with this new approach by these organizations. 
From this, a generic process for stakeholder-oriented water valuation is emerging to more firmly link water 
valuation to stakeholder processes. This stakeholder-oriented valuation process is based on the IWRM 
process as conceptualized by GWP (2004), but focusing specifically on the implications of linking 
valuation to stakeholders as part of water management processes. Essentially, the process consists of seven 
elements that are linked to one another as a logical sequence of activities: 
1. Identify the main triggers for the process, problems to be addressed and stakeholders involved 
2. Identify and structure the objectives that are at stake, covering each involved stakeholder, to ensure 
that the full range of values is considered 
3. Value the existing situation, using indicators that are linked to the identified objectives 
4. Identify possible measures that can help improve the situation, including economic instruments 
5. Assess the expected impacts of possible measures, covering the full range of identified objectives 
6. Evaluate, refine and chose a set of measures / economic arrangements to implement 
7. Implement, monitor and evaluate the impacts of the implemented (economic) arrangements 
 
The structure of the seven elements outlined above suggests a linear process, but often reality is different; 
this is the case for IWRM processes generally (GWP, 2004) and also for stakeholder-oriented valuation. 
Water management processes may move from problem to solutions, from solutions to other solutions or 
even from one problem to the next. Also, the group of stakeholders involved is likely to change over the 
course of the process, as some stakeholders may disengage themselves and new stakeholders may enter the 
process in a later stage, changing the range and priority of the values, problems and solutions that are 
considered in the process. Whatever the exact sequence of activities in a stakeholder process, the role of 
stakeholder-oriented water valuation should be to support stakeholders by explicating the problems and the 
values involved, sharing the different perspectives and positions, and through this process, identifying 
solutions that can form an agreeable basis for action. The seven elements outlined above are considered 
essential for a sound stakeholder-oriented valuation process, be it as a direct sequence or in a more 
haphazard way. 
 
Illustrating the stakeholder-oriented valuation process for the case of New York City 
 
The use of the stakeholder-oriented valuation process is illustrated for one of the cases discussed before: 
the New York City Watershed Agreement. Table 1 shows how the process in the NYC watershed can be 
described in terms of the procedure for stakeholder-oriented water valuation. It illustrates that the seven 
elements in the stakeholder-oriented water valuation process should be used in an iterative way and that 
sometimes certain steps need to be repeated whereas others can be skipped. 
 
Although it is a hypothetical example, Table 1 illustrates the general thinking behind stakeholder-oriented 
water valuation and demonstrates how a stakeholder-oriented valuation approach fits the (negotiation) 
processes by which economic instruments for water resources management are developed. Stakeholder-
oriented valuation features a pragmatic use of analytic tools, including some ‘straightforward’ economic 
analyses, which are relatively easy to incorporate in a participatory process. For instance, the main value 
driving the process in New York was the financial costs of filtration. This was relatively easy to estimate 
and, although the estimate had a considerable margin of uncertainty, it effectively triggered New York City 
to search for alternative solutions. 
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Table 1  Illustration of the stakeholder-oriented water valuation process for the NYC Watershed Agreement 
Element in the 
process 
Explanation for the NYC Watershed case 
Triggers and key 
stakeholders 
EPA Surface Water Treatment Rules issued in 1989 require NYC to protect water sources or build 
filtration plants for its drinking water. Key stakeholders are NYC, EPA, watershed communities 
Main objectives 
and associated 
stakeholders 
Safe and reliable drinking water supply – EPA and NYC 
Financial costs within reasonable limits for drinking water supply – NYC 
Local economic development opportunities – watershed communities 
Values current 
practices (current 
values here taken 
as 1996 values) 
Current drinking water supply meets health criteria, but fear is that increased human activity in 
watersheds threatens ability to meet standards in future, especially for pathogens and 
phosphorus (ref:NRC, 2000) 
Costs for NYC drinking water supply: US$ 450 mln for water supply and wastewater collection in 
2002, so presumably less in the 1990s (ref: NYC, 2002) 
Economic development in watersheds: local economic indicators score low in comparison to NYC 
and national averages. For instance, 1996 per capita personal income (PCPI) was US$ 18 743 for 
the non-metropolitan areas in New York State, which include the NYC Watershed area; PCPI was 
US$ 29 320 for metropolitan area; for US as a whole it was US$ 24 175 (ref: BEA, 2005). 
Possible measures Build filtration plant (option for NYC) 
Request filtration avoidance based on unilaterally imposed watershed rules (option for NYC) 
Request filtration avoidance based on agreement NYC and watershed communities to control 
pollution on voluntary basis (joint option for NYC & watershed communities) 
Impacts of 
measures 
Filtration plant: reliable and safe drinking water supply, investment of US$ 6-8 billion and annual 
operating costs of US$ 300 million (costs for NYC) (ref: NRC, 2000) 
Filtration avoidance based on strict watershed rules: impaired economic development (economic 
impact: local counties to remain at bottom end of state and national lists, affected stakeholders: 
watershed communities); reliable and safe drinking water supply, with possibly some remaining 
risk of pathogen outbreaks (impacts relevant for NYC and EPA) 
Filtration avoidance based on agreement and compensation payments: slightly reduced range of 
options for economic development but compensation and support for certain types of economic 
activities (such as best practices for farms) (watershed communities); reliable and safe drinking 
water supply, with some remaining risk of pathogen outbreaks (impacts relevant for NYC and 
EPA); investment of US$ 1.5 billion over 10 year period by NYC (ref: NRC, 2000) 
Choice Request filtration avoidance based on strict watershed rules and regulations, together with some 
voluntary activities with watershed communities (unilateral decision by NYC) 
Implementation - 
Trigger round 2 
New watershed rules announced by NYC, appealed by watershed communities in lawsuit. 
Impasse, need for external intervention by a new stakeholder: the Governor of New York State 
Key objectives As above plus the objective of New York State for healthy regional development, balancing the 
urban and rural interests in the state 
Measures As above but minus the option of unilateral imposition of stricter rules by NYC 
Choice Filtration avoidance based on agreement among NYC and watershed communities (i.e. payment 
for environmental service scheme) 
Implementation, 
monitoring and 
evaluation 
Agreement under implementation since 1999, through various watershed programmes. Impacts 
are improved management practices on farms, upgrading of wastewater treatment plants in 
watershed towns, rehabilitation of numerous septic tanks (ref: Brown, 2000) 
A first evaluation of the agreement has been executed by the National Research Council in 2000 
upon request of NYC (source: NRC, 2000) 
Monitoring water quality in reservoirs is done continuously and will determine whether or not 
additional activities are required to meet the objectives of safe and reliable drinking water supply 
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Conclusions 
 
The available experiences show that economic arrangements can offer useful tools for efficient, equitable 
and sustainable water resources management, but that they need to be accompanied by adequate 
administrative arrangements and embedded in an appropriate institutional framework. Apart from 
knowledge about the economic, administrative and institutional arrangements, a proper understanding of 
the mechanisms that determine success of failure of economic arrangements also requires knowledge about 
the processes through which they are developed. A review of three cases where economic arrangements 
have been successfully implemented, shows that the economic arrangements have been the result of a 
negotiation process among multiple stakeholders. The stakeholder process was especially important to 
reach an agreement about the administrative and regulatory arrangements that set the boundaries within 
which economic arrangements were confined to ensure that societal goals are not jeopardized. This means 
that new economic arrangements need to be carefully designed, with the involvement of multiple 
stakeholders. 
 
More insight is needed in these multi-stakeholder processes, to identify certain commonalities that can help 
support future negotiations among stakeholders about the regulations and conditions required to put in 
place sustainable economic arrangements for water resources management. Nevertheless, one thing that is 
clear already from the three described cases, is that a transparent assessment of the value that water 
resources represent to the involved stakeholders, as well as to society as a whole, will be helpful to support 
this process. For this, traditional economic valuation methods need to be complemented by stakeholder-
oriented approaches that help to facilitate dialogue among stakeholders and that can effectively incorporate 
the broader societal concerns related to social equity and environmental sustainability, beyond mere 
monetary values. Further work in this area is needed, building on the experiences that have already been 
gained and from which a process for stakeholder-oriented valuation emerges. This needs to be further 
developed into sound operational methodologies that link water valuation to the stakeholder processes by 
which economic arrangements are developed. Specific attention is needed for the participatory aspects in 
such valuation methodologies, as well as for the assessment of the broader societal values associated with 
water resources management. 
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